The Property Company (P) Ltd Vs Rohinten Daddy Mazda - The provisions of the Act, 1963 (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.

  SCI (2026.01.07) in The Property Company (P) Ltd Vs Rohinten Daddy Mazda  [2026 INSC 33, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 92 OF 2026, (Arising out of S.L.P (Civil) No. 3906 of 2017)] held that; 

• The provisions of the Act, 1963 (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.

• It has been clarified that when such authorities or bodies are deemed to be a court for certain limited or specified purposes, such a legal fiction must not be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction was created so as to confer powers under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 as well.

Excerpts of the Order;

G. CONCLUSION

# 160. A conspectus of the legal and factual discussion on the power of the CLB to extend time or condone delay under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 is as follows:

i. The appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 preferred by the respondent herein was filed during the period between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016. Therefore, although the appeal was made under the new provision of the Act, 2013, yet the body/forum before which it was made i.e., the CLB, was one constituted under the provisions of the Erstwhile Act. According to Section 10E(4C) of the Erstwhile Act, the CLB was a court only in the restricted sense. There existed no express provision which empowered the CLB to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963 to the proceedings and appeals before itself.

ii. In multiple decisions of this Court, notable and significant emphasis has been placed on which institution/body is seeking  to employ the provisions of the Act, 1963 or exercise the powers conferred under the Act, 1963.

iii. The provisions of the Act, 1963 (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.

iv. In Officer on Special Duty (supra), Prakash H. Jain (supra) and Om Prakash (supra) respectively, this Court has unequivocally held that the power to extend time under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to by statutory authorities, quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless expressly indicated. It has been clarified that when such authorities or bodies are deemed to be a court for certain limited or specified purposes, such a legal fiction must not be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction was created so as to confer powers under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 as well.

v. In Parson Tools (supra) and M.P. Steel (supra) respectively, this Court has developed a body of jurisprudence indicating that the principles underlying Section 14 of the Act, 1963 could be applied to the provisions relating to quasi-judicial bodies, unless  there is any express indication to the contrary in the wording and scheme of the said provision. However, there exists a vital distinction between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 respectively.

vi. The differences between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively are as follows - First, one pertains to the exercise of a discretionary power vested in the courts and the other is a mandatory provision independent of any exercise of discretion; Secondly, one refers to “sufficient cause” which term by itself is subject to a good amount of elasticity and the other has delineated well-defined conditions which must be met; and Lastly, one deals with the extension of time while the other is concerned with the exclusion of time.

vii. The principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively, cannot be analogously applied to proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies because in the former, the courts exercise their discretion in extending and more specifically, adjusting the prescribed period of limitation itself to create a fresh period of limitation. No entitlement as a matter of right arises vis-à-vis extension of time. Whereas, in the latter, the prescribed period of limitation remains intact, no delay is attributed to the litigant and the time during which the abortive proceeding was being prosecuted is expunged in the eyes of the law to place the litigant back or restore his position within the  prescribed period of limitation wherein he is entitled to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, as a matter of right.

viii. The mechanism envisaged under Section 5 is proximally bound and tethered to the discretion with which a civil court is empowered and that under Section 14 is anchored on restoring the right of a litigant to institute an appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation. Both provisions work in the interest of the litigant and seek to further the cause of substantive justice, however, the kind and nature of the power exercised under the two provisions, as well as the mechanism envisaged therein, are quite distinct.

ix. Moreover, the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively also stand on a different footing for the reason that when the legislature has intended to grant powers of extension of time, the same has been expressly indicated either through the manner in which the concerned provision is phrased (more often than not through a proviso) or by the adoption of the Act, 1963 through a separate provision to the special law as a whole (akin to Section 433 of the 2013, Act).

x. Therefore, the decision of this Court in M.P. Steel (supra) would not apply analogously to a situation when the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 are sought to be applied by quasi-judicial bodies which aren’t empowered in that regard.

xi. Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations which saves the inherent power of the CLB would not enable the CLB to extend time for the filing of the appeal or the application itself, as the case may be.

xii. In Ganesan (supra), it has been settled that the savings provision in the Act, 1963 i.e., Section 29(2), is of no relevance when the special or local law deals with a suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, which is to be filed before a quasi-judicial body. The question whether a certain provision in a special or a local law expressly excludes the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively arises only in pursuance of the savings provision under Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963. As a natural corollary, if Section 29(2) is, by itself, inapplicable to a particular case then there would be no need to look into or analyse whether there is any express exclusion.

xiii. An exception to the aforesaid, i.e., a reason why one would still look at whether Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively are “expressly excluded” irrespective of the application of Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963, is when the argument that the principles underlying those provisions of the Act, 1963, must be applied, is being explored.

xiv. Presently, we are dealing with an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 preferred before the CLB – a quasi-judicial body.

We have also answered in the negative on the submission that the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 must be applied. Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963 is, therefore, of no relevance and there arises no occasion to examine whether Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 “expressly excludes” the application of Section 5 of the Act, 1963.

xv. The simpliciter limitation period prescribed under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 must not be read to be merely directory. The presence of any additional pre-emptory language in the form of “but not thereafter” or “shall” would not always be necessary to convey that the prescribed period is mandatory.

xvi. Section 433 of the Act, 2013 which empowers the NCLT and the NCLAT respectively to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963, as far as may be, to the proceedings and appeals before itself, cannot be borrowed to signify the existence of a similar power with respect to the CLB. Moreover, the remedy of the respondent was already time-barred before the coming into force of Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013, let alone the coming into force of Section 433 of the Act, 2013. Hence, the change in law cannot enure to the benefit of the present respondent.

# 161. In the overall view of the matter, we have reached the conclusion that the High Court could be said to have committed an error in dismissing the statutory appeal filed under Section 10F of the  Erstwhile Act and thereby, affirming the order of the CLB condoning the delay of 249 days in filing the appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013.

# 162. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby, allowed. The impugned judgement and order of the High Court is set-aside.

# 163. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

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Shivamma (Dead) by LRs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. - "the delay in the filing has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause” that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be,"

 SCI (2025.09.12) in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1104) held that;

• # 37. When one reads the phrase “within such period” together with the expressions “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring the appeal or making the application”, it becomes as clear as a noon day, that the said phrase i.e., “within such period” includes both the original period of limitation prescribed as-well as the period of delay leading up to the actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. There can be no question of construing “within such period” as making a reference either to only the original period of limitation or to only the actual period of delay after the expiry of limitation.

• # 40. As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause” that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

AI Generative Summary

The document is a Supreme Court of India judgment concerning a civil appeal related to the condonation of a significant delay in filing a second appeal regarding a land ownership dispute.

Supreme Court Case Overview

This case involves the Supreme Court of India reviewing a High Court decision that condoned a significant delay in filing a second appeal regarding land ownership disputes.

• The appeal arises from a High Court order dated 21.03.2017.

• The delay in filing the second appeal was 3966 days.

• The case involves land originally owned by the appellant's father, leading to disputes and legal proceedings. ​

Background of the Dispute

The case centers around a parcel of land and the legal complexities following the death of the original owner.

• The land in question is Survey No. 56/A, measuring 9 acres 13 guntas.

• A partition suit (O.S. No. 74 of 1971) was initiated among the legal heirs after the father's death.

• A donation of 4 acres of the land to the Government of Karnataka occurred during the partition suit. ​

Legal Proceedings Timeline

The timeline of legal actions taken by the appellant and the outcomes of various court decisions are crucial to understanding the case.

• A compromise decree in 1989 declared the appellant as the absolute owner of the land. ​

• The appellant filed O.S. No. 1100 of 1989 against the Karnataka Housing Board for possession.

• The Trial Court dismissed the suit on 17.04.1997, leading to an appeal (Regular Appeal No. ​ 405 of 2004).

High Court's Condonation of Delay

The High Court's decision to condone the delay in filing the second appeal is a central issue in this case.

• The High Court allowed the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

• The delay was attributed to negligence by the Housing Board officials. ​

• The appellant argues that no sufficient cause was shown for the delay.

Arguments from the Appellant

The appellant's legal counsel presents several key arguments against the High Court's decision.

• The respondent failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay.

• The last entry in the Housing Board's file was dated 20.03.2008, indicating negligence. ​

• The appellant cites previous judgments to support the argument that negligence should not be rewarded.

Arguments from the Respondent

The respondent's counsel defends the High Court's decision to condone the delay, emphasizing public interest.

• The respondent argues that the High Court's discretion should not be interfered with. ​

• They assert that substantial justice should prevail over technicalities.

• The respondent claims that the delay did not benefit the litigant and was due to public officials' lapses.

Legal Questions for Determination

The Supreme Court identifies key legal questions that need resolution in this case.

• What does "within such period" mean in Section 5 of the Limitation Act? ​

• When can a court's discretion in condoning delay be challenged?

• Was the High Court justified in condoning the delay in this case? ​

Analysis of Section 5 of the Limitation Act

The Supreme Court examines the interpretation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act regarding delay condonation. ​

• Section 5 allows for condonation of delay if sufficient cause is shown. ​

• There is a divergence of opinion on the period for which sufficient cause must be demonstrated. ​

• The court discusses previous rulings that interpret "within such period" differently.

Contradictory Views on Delay Condonation

The Supreme Court highlights conflicting interpretations of the term "within such period" in legal precedents. ​

• Some rulings suggest sufficient cause must be shown only for the period after the limitation expires.

• Other rulings require sufficient cause to be demonstrated for the entire limitation period. ​

• The court emphasizes the need for clarity in interpreting these legal standards.

Legal Interpretation of Limitation Act

The text discusses the interpretation of the Limitation Act, particularly focusing on the concept of "sufficient cause" for condoning delays in filing appeals or applications. ​

• The party must demonstrate that the failure to file within the limitation period was due to circumstances arising before the limitation expired. ​

• Events occurring after the expiry of the limitation period cannot constitute sufficient cause. ​

• The High Court erred in condoning delays without sufficient cause established within the limitation period.

Sufficient Cause and Its Requirements

The text elaborates on the definition and requirements of "sufficient cause" as per the Limitation Act. ​

• "Sufficient cause" must show that the failure to file was not due to negligence or inactivity. ​

• The party must provide a satisfactory explanation for the entire duration from the start of the limitation period to the actual filing date.

• The courts have discretion to condone delays if sufficient cause is shown, but must consider the party's diligence.

Interpretation of "Within Such Period"

The text analyzes the phrase "within such period" in the context of the Limitation Act.

• "Within such period" includes both the original limitation period and the period after its expiry until the actual filing. ​

• The phrase cannot be conflated with "during such period" or "for such period." ​

• The interpretation emphasizes the need for a comprehensive understanding of the entire duration relevant to the filing. ​

Judicial Precedents and Their Impact

The text references various judicial decisions that shape the understanding of the Limitation Act. ​

• The decision in Ajit Singh Thakur emphasizes that sufficient cause must arise before the limitation expires. ​

• The case of Basawaraj highlights that negligence or inactivity cannot be imputed to the party seeking condonation.

• The ruling in Rewa Coal Fields suggests that the inquiry into a party's diligence is limited to the period after sufficient cause is shown. ​

Legislative Intent and Public Policy

The text discusses the underlying public policy and legislative intent behind the Limitation Act.

• The law of limitation aims to prevent stale claims and ensure timely resolution of disputes.

• It reflects the principle that litigation should not be prolonged indefinitely.

• The courts are mandated to dismiss suits filed after the limitation period, reinforcing the importance of vigilance in legal proceedings. ​

Condonation of Delay and Limitation Act

The text discusses the principles and judicial interpretations surrounding the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

• The Limitation Act prescribes a six-month limitation for applications, and sufficient cause must be shown for any delay.

• Judicial consensus exists that sufficient cause must cover the entire period of delay. ​

• Condonation of delay is viewed as an extension of the limitation period, not an exclusion of it. ​

• The court has discretion to condone delay, but this is not a matter of right. ​

• The expression "sufficient cause" must be interpreted liberally to advance substantial justice. ​

Judicial Precedents on Condonation

The text references key judicial decisions that shape the understanding of "sufficient cause" in the context of delay. ​

• The Supreme Court has consistently held that sufficient cause must be established for the entire period from the start of limitation to the filing date.

• In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, it was emphasized that courts have discretion to condone delay even if sufficient cause is shown. ​

• The court's discretion is not limited to determining sufficient cause but also includes whether to condone the delay. ​

• The principle of substantial justice must be balanced with the law of limitation. ​

Importance of Sufficient Cause

The text elaborates on the definition and significance of "sufficient cause" in legal proceedings.

• "Sufficient cause" is not precisely defined but is meant to empower courts to prevent genuine litigants from being shut out due to unavoidable delays. ​

• The burden of proof lies with the party seeking condonation, and the explanation must be bona fide and free of negligence. ​

• Courts must distinguish between an explanation and an excuse, with the former being necessary for condonation. ​

• A justice-oriented approach is essential, prioritizing substantial justice over technicalities. ​

Length of Delay and Its Implications

The text discusses how the length of delay affects the court's decision on condonation.

• The length of delay is not inherently indicative of negligence; rather, the acceptability of the explanation is crucial. ​

• A short delay may be dismissed if not supported by sufficient cause, while a long delay can be condoned if justified. ​

• The quantum of delay influences the scrutiny required for the explanation but does not determine sufficiency. ​

• Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach, distinguishing between inordinate delays and minor delays.

Technical Considerations vs. Substantive Justice

The text emphasizes the need for a balance between procedural rules and the pursuit of justice. ​

• Procedural rigidity should not obstruct justice; courts must adopt a liberal interpretation of "sufficient cause." ​

• Technicalities should not prevent genuine claims from being heard, especially when they do not result in injustice.

• The law of limitation is designed to prevent inordinate delays, not to destroy rights. ​

• Courts must ensure that the balance between justice and certainty is maintained. ​

Discretion in Condoning Delay

The text outlines the discretionary powers of courts in matters of condoning delay. ​

• Courts have the discretion to condone delay based on the existence of sufficient cause. ​

• The exercise of discretion is not final and can be questioned by higher courts. ​

• The appellate court should not interfere with the lower court's discretion unless it acted arbitrarily or without evidence. ​

• The inquiry into the propriety of discretion involves assessing whether the sufficient cause was adequately established. ​

State Lethargy and Condonation of Delay

The text addresses the unique considerations for the State and public authorities in delay cases.

• Historically, courts have afforded leeway to the State due to the complexities of governmental functioning. ​

• The rationale is that the State represents public interest, and strict standards may lead to injustice.

• Courts have emphasized a pragmatic approach in cases involving the State, allowing for delays without requiring detailed explanations for each day. ​

• The principle is that public interest should not suffer due to bureaucratic delays.

Condonation of Delay in Government Appeals

The text discusses the legal principles surrounding the condonation of delay in appeals filed by the State, emphasizing the unique challenges faced by governmental entities.

• The State's bureaucratic processes often lead to delays in decision-making.

• Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach when considering delay explanations from the State.

• The concept of "sufficient cause" should be interpreted liberally in favor of the State to avoid public interest suffering.

• ​

Judicial Precedents on Condonation of Delay

The text references several landmark cases that have shaped the understanding of condonation of delay in governmental contexts.

• The decision in State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO acknowledged bureaucratic realities causing delays. ​

• The G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer case emphasized that public interest suffers when government appeals are dismissed due to delays. ​

• The Indian Oil Corpn. case highlighted that a strict standard of proof should not be applied to the State as it may lead to injustice.

Shift in Legal Approach Post-Postmaster General

The text outlines a significant shift in jurisprudence regarding the treatment of delay in government appeals following the Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. decision. ​

• The Supreme Court emphasized that the law of limitation applies equally to the State and private litigants.

• The traditional leniency towards government delays based on bureaucratic inefficiencies is no longer acceptable.

• Condonation of delay should only occur with reasonable and acceptable explanations, not merely due to procedural red tape.

Implications of Condonation of Delay on Public Interest

The text discusses the broader implications of condoning delays in government appeals on public welfare. ​

• Dismissal of government appeals due to delays can adversely affect public interest and the community at large. ​

• The courts must balance the need for timely justice with the realities of governmental functioning. ​

• The principle of public interest should guide decisions on condonation, ensuring that legitimate claims are not frustrated by procedural technicalities.

Recent Judicial Trends and Expectations

The text highlights recent judicial trends and expectations regarding the conduct of government entities in filing appeals.

• Courts have increasingly expressed frustration over the casual approach of government bodies towards limitations. ​

• There is a growing expectation for government officials to be held accountable for delays in legal proceedings.

• The judiciary is moving towards imposing costs on government entities for wasting judicial time due to unnecessary delays.

Evolution of Condonation of Delay Jurisprudence

The jurisprudence regarding the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has shifted towards treating governmental and private litigants equally. ​

• The law has evolved to emphasize accountability and diligence in public litigation.

• Earlier cases favored a liberal approach for the State, citing bureaucratic complexities.

• Current jurisprudence insists that no litigant, including the State, is entitled to a broader margin of error due to inaction or negligence. ​

• Condonation of delay is now considered an exception, requiring a bona fide and cogent cause for delay.

Distinction Between Explanation and Excuse

The distinction between an "explanation" and an "excuse" is crucial in evaluating claims for condonation of delay.

• An "excuse" often indicates a denial of responsibility, while an "explanation" shows genuine reasons for delay. ​

• Courts must carefully assess whether bureaucratic inefficiencies constitute an "explanation" or merely an "excuse." ​

• Each case must be evaluated on its own facts to determine the validity of the explanation provided.

High Court's Discretion in Condonation of Delay

The High Court's discretion in condoning delay must be evaluated based on the legal standards at the time of the decision. ​

• The exercise of discretion by the High Court in 2017 must be assessed against the legal framework existing at that time.

• Changes in law, such as those established in Postmaster General (supra), empower appellate courts to review lower court decisions.

• Courts should prioritize a pragmatic approach over technicalities when considering condonation of delay. ​

Public Policy and Public Interest Considerations

Public policy dictates that limitation laws serve the general welfare by ensuring timely governmental action. ​

• Condoning delays due to governmental inefficiency undermines public interest and accountability. ​

• The State must act with diligence, as repeated indulgence in condoning delays fosters a culture of irresponsibility. ​

• Public interest is better served by enforcing limitations rather than excusing governmental negligence. ​

High Court's Justification for Condoning Delay

The High Court's decision to condone an 11-year delay was deemed unjustified and contrary to established legal principles.

• The respondent failed to provide a sufficient cause for the significant delay in filing the second appeal.

• The High Court's acceptance of bureaucratic inefficiencies as sufficient cause was criticized as a misapplication of the law.

• The delay of 3966 days was viewed as excessive, undermining the principles of limitation and public policy.

Conclusion and Implications of the Judgment

The judgment emphasizes the need for strict adherence to limitation laws and accountability in governmental actions.

• The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside due to the lack of sufficient cause for delay.

• Additional costs were imposed on the respondent to reinforce accountability.

• The ruling serves as a warning to High Courts against condoning delays based on superficial grounds, stressing the importance of timely justice.

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