Shankar Khandelwal Vs. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. - The admission of a claim by RP is merely an administrative/clerical task performed as part of its statutory duties under Section 18 of the Code8 and, therefore, admission of claim by RP only means induction/entry of a claim. An admission of a claim by RP is akin to mere recital/reference of debt, which does not amount to an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the 1963 Act9. Therefore, IRP’s admission of secured financial creditors debt in first CIRP was not an acknowledgement under Section 18 of 1963 Act.

 SCI (2026.04.29) in Shankar Khandelwal Vs. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. [2026 INSC 429, CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 13158-13159 OF 2025] held that;-

• At the outset, it must be noted that scope and ambit of Section 18 of the 1963 Act are well-settled. For a writing to constitute a valid acknowledgment, it must be made by the party against whom the right is claimed, or by a person duly authorized on its behalf; it must be made before the expiration of the prescribed period of limitation; and, most importantly, it must evince a conscious and unequivocal intention to admit a subsisting jural relationship and an existing liability.

• The provisions of the Code and the Regulations were considered by this Court7 and it has been held that RP has no adjudicatory powers and his role involves collation of claims. RP performs its administrative duties under Section 18 of the Code.

• The admission of a claim by RP is merely an administrative/clerical task performed as part of its statutory duties under Section 18 of the Code8 and, therefore, admission of claim by RP only means induction/entry of a claim. An admission of a claim by RP is akin to mere recital/reference of debt, which does not amount to an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the 1963 Act9. Therefore, IRP’s admission of secured financial creditors debt in first CIRP was not an acknowledgement under Section 18 of 1963 Act.

Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. These appeals under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), are directed against the impugned judgment dated 15.10.2025 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), whereby the

order dated 22.01.2025 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), admitting two separate petitions under Section 7 of the Code and initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), has been affirmed.

# 2. The central question that arises for determination in these appeals are whether the application filed under Section 7 of the Code by the secured financial creditor was within the period of limitation.

FACTS

# 3. The facts giving rise to the filing of these appeals, briefly stated, are that the appellant is the erstwhile Director of Shrinathji Business Ventures Private Limited and Samaria Business Ventures Private Limited (Corporate Debtors). Two separate loans were sanctioned by Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd., (DHFL) in September 2014 for sums of Rs.12 crores and Rs.11 crores, out of which Rs.11.50 crores and Rs.11 crores respectively were disbursed. The corporate debtors defaulted in repayment, and on 06.12.2016, DHFL classified their accounts as Non-Performing Assets (NPA). Subsequently, DHFL itself entered CIRP pursuant to proceedings initiated by the Reserve Bank of India, and on 07.06.2021, a resolution plan submitted by Piramal Capital & Housing Finance Ltd., (PCHFL) was approved by the NCLT, Mumbai. On 10.01.2021, PCHFL assigned the subject

loans to Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., the secured financial creditor.

# 4. Following the termination of the earlier CIRP, the secured financial creditor filed an application under Section 7 of the Code on 23.09.2024 against the corporate debtor. By order dated 22.01.2025, the NCLT held that the application was within limitation and admitted the same.

# 5. The appellant challenged the aforesaid order in appeal. By order dated 15.10.2025, the NCLAT, inter alia, held that the admission of the claim by the Resolution Professional (RP) in the first CIRP against the corporate debtor on 22.05.2022 constituted a valid acknowledgment, and its subsequent updating on 21.01.2024 constituted a second acknowledgment. It was further held that, if limitation is computed from either of these dates, the debt is not timebarred. Accordingly, the NCLAT concluded that the petition under Section 7 of the Code was within limitation and affirmed the order of the NCLT. In this factual background, the present appeals arise for consideration.

SUBMISSIONS

# 6. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the date of default of corporate debtor was 06.12.2016 and the limitation would have expired on 06.12.2019. It is, however, submitted that the period of limitation remained suspended from 03.12.2019 to 29.04.2024 in

view of mandate contained in Section 60(6) of the Code. However, the period of limitation expired three days after 29.04.2024, whereas, the petition under Section 7 of the Code was filed by the secured creditors on 23.09.2024, and was thus barred by limitation.

# 7. It is further contended that admission of debt by an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) cannot be equated with an acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1963 Act”). It is urged that the admission of claims is merely an administrative function of the IRP under Section 18 of the Code. It was argued that the IRP’s admission of the secured financial creditor’s claim in the first CIRP does not constitute an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the 1963 Act. Accordingly, it is submitted that the application under Section 7 of the Code was filed beyond the prescribed period of three years and is barred by limitation. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court1.

# 8. Learned senior counsel for the respondent no. 1, on the other hand, submitted that the period of limitation would commence from 06.12.2017 i.e., upon expiry of the period prescribed under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(4) of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the SARFAESI Act, 2002”) expired. It is further submitted that in view of the order passed by this Court2, the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022, is excluded from computation of limitation. It is pointed out that during the pendency of the first CIRP on 02.05.2022, IRP acknowledged the debt. It is contended that petition under Section 7 of the Code was within limitation. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court3.

# 9. We have considered the rival submissions and have perused the records.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

# 10. We take note of the relevant statutory provisions. Article 137 of the 1963 Act is extracted below for the facility of reference: - 

Description	Period of Limitation	Time From which Period Begins to Run
Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division.	Three years	When the right to apply accrues.

Section 60 of the Code deals with adjudicating authority for corporatepersons. Section 60(6) of the Code, which is relevant for the purposes of the controversy involved in these appeals read as under: -

• “Notwithstanding anything contained in theLimitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) or in any other law for the time being in force, in computing the period of limitation specified for any suit or application by or against a corporate debtor for which an order of moratorium has been made under this Part, the period during which such moratorium is in place shall be excluded.”

ISSUES

# 11. The following issues arise for consideration in these appeals 

• (i) whether the period of limitation for filing the petition under Section 7 of the Code has to be reckoned from 06.12.2016 or 06.12.2017, 

• (ii) whether the petition under Section 7 of the Code is within limitation, and 

• (iii) whether an admission of debt by an IRP amounts to acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the 1963 Act.

ANALYSIS

# 12. The relevant undisputed facts are reflected in the following chronology of events:

Date	Particulars
26.09.2014	Loan facility was sanctioned to the Corporate Debtors by DHFL.
06.12.2016	Loan Accounts of the Corporate Debtors were declared as an NPA.
06.02.2017	60 days as mandated under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, concluded.
03.12.2019	NCLAT admitted CIRP against DHFL
15.03.2020	Covid-19 extension of limitation period commenced.
07.06.2021	Resolution plan of PCHFL was approved by NCLT in CIRP of DHFL
23.12.2021	NCLT admitted CIRP against the CD (first CIRP) and moratorium was imposed.
30.05.2022	Covid-19 extension of limitation period concludes.
10.01.2023	PCHFL assigned its debt of CD to Secured Financial Creditor.
29.07.2024	NCLT terminated first CIRP on the ground of fraudulent initiation of CIRP.
23.09.2024	The Secured Financial Creditor filed a petition under Section 7 of the Code.

# .13. It is well-settled in law that the limitation for filing an application under Section 7 of the Code is three years and is governed by Article 137 of 1963 Act4. An application under Section 7 of the Code is governed by Article 137 of the 1963 Act. The accrual of such right has been consistently interpreted by this Court to arise on the date of the default, that is, when the corporate debtor first fails to discharge its repayment obligations. The limitation begins to run from the date of classification of the account as NPA, being the date of default, and not from any subsequent proceeding initiated for recovery5. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that accounts of the CD were declared NPA on 06.12.2016. Therefore, the right to file a petition under Section 7 of the Code accrued on 06.12.2016. Accordingly, the first issue is answered in the aforesaid terms.

# 14. In the facts of the present case, the period of limitation for filing the petition under Section 7 of the Code, commences from 06.12.2016. The period of limitation would have expired on 06.12.2019. However, following three events have intervened before filing of petition under Section of the Code namely: -

• (i) Commencement of CIRP of DHFL from 03.12.2019 to 07.06.2021 from which it is evident that CIRP went beyond the expiry of three years period on 06.12.2019.

• (ii) Before the expiry of the CIRP of DHFL, the Suo Motu Order of this Court due to Covid Pandemic directed exclusion of limitation period commencing from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022. Further, this limitation period is extended by another 90 days from 01.03.2022.

• (iii) Before expiry of extension of limitation by virtue of Suo Motu order of this Court, CIRP as against the appellant itself commenced on 23.12.2021 and continued till 29.07.2024.

# 15. After reckoning three years from 06.12.2016 and excluding the above referred periods, only three days remain from 29.07.2024 which would expire on 01.08.2024. However, petition under Section 7 was filed on 23.09.2024 which is well beyond the period of limitation. Accordingly, the second issue is answered.

# 16. The third issue pertains to legal character of the admission of a claim by the IRP/RP and whether such admission can be construed as admission of liability so as to extend the period of limitation under Section 18 of the 1963 Act. At the outset, it must be noted that scope and ambit of Section 18 of the 1963 Act are well-settled. For a writing to constitute a valid acknowledgment, it must be made by the party against whom the right is claimed, or by a person duly authorized on its behalf; it must be made before the expiration of the prescribed period of limitation; and, most importantly, it must evince a conscious and unequivocal intention to admit a subsisting jural relationship and an existing liability. A mere reference to a past transaction or a bald recital of a debt, without an intention to admit liability, would not suffice. The said principle has been authoritatively enunciated by this Court6. The provisions of the Code and the Regulations were considered by this Court7 and it has been held that RP has no adjudicatory powers and his role involves collation of claims. RP performs its administrative duties under Section 18 of the Code. The admission of a claim by RP is merely an administrative/clerical task performed as part of its statutory duties under Section 18 of the Code8 and, therefore, admission of claim by RP only means induction/entry of a claim. An admission of a claim by RP is akin to mere recital/reference of debt, which does not amount to an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the 1963 Act9. Therefore, IRP’s admission of secured financial creditors debt in first CIRP was not an acknowledgement under Section 18 of 1963 Act. Accordingly, third issue is answered.

# 17. It is a well-settled legal proposition that an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the 1963 Act can only extend/renew a limitation period which has not already expired10. Therefore, a limitation period can be extended only by an acknowledgment which is made within the period of limitation. In any case, the admission of claim of secured financial creditor by IRP on 02.05.2022 does not enure to the benefit of the secured financial creditor as the same was not made within the period of limitation.

CONCLUSION

# 18. In view of foregoing analysis, the impugned judgment dated 15.10.2025 and order dated 22.01.2025 passed by NCLAT and NCLT respectively are quashed and set aside.

# 19. In the result, the appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to Costs

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References

1 Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar, (2020) 15 SCC 1; Prabhakaran & Ors. v. M. Azhagiri Pillai (Dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 484; Tilak Ram & Ors. v. Nathu & Ors., 1966 SCC OnLine SC 99; Valliamma Champaka Pillai v. Sivathanu Pillai & Ors., (1979) 4 SCC 429; Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. through authorised signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 531; Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 545; China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. & Ors., (2025) 7 SCC 729; Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Kew Precision Parts Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2022) 9 SCC 364; Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India & Anr., (2021) 8 SCC 481; Reliance Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Hotel Poonja International Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 352; Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Hirakud Industrial Works Ltd. & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1554 and Expert Realty Professionals Pvt. Ltd. through Neeraj Gusain v. Logix Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. through RP Mr. Pawan Kumar Goyal & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1455

2 Cognizance For Extension of Limitation, In Re; (2022) 3 SCC 117

3 New Delhi Municipal Council v. Minosha India Limited, (2022) 8 SCC 384; Laxmi Pat Surana (supra); Shantanu Jagdish Prakash v. SBI & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine NCLAT 117; Mavjibhai Nagarbhai Patel v. SBI & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine NCLAT 2014; R. Kandasamy (D) & Ors. v. T.R.K. Sarawathy & Anr., (2025) 3 SCC 513; S. Shivraj Reddy (D) thr. LRs. & Anr. v. S. Raghuraj Reddy & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 963; National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Naresh Kumar Badrikumar Jagad & Ors., (2011) 12 SCC 695; Marg Ltd. v. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. and Marg Ltd. v. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd., SCC OnLine Cal 7940

4 Babulal Vardharji Gurjar (supra)

5 BK Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Paras Gupta & Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633; Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave v. Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. & Anr., (2019) 10 SCC 572; Babulal Vardharji Gurjar (supra) and Tech Sharp Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Sanghvi Movers Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 531

6 Prabhakaran (supra); Tilak Ram (supra) and Valliamma (supra)

7 Swiss Ribbons Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 4 SCC 17 and Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Limited; (2023) 10 SCC 545

8 Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. through authorised signatory (supra)

9 Prabhakaran & Ors. (supra), Tilak Ram & Ors. (supra) and Valliamma Champaka Pillai (supra)

10 Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. (supra); Laxmi Pat Surana (supra); Reliance Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (supra) and M/s. Airen and Associates v. M/s. Sanmar Engineering Services Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1562

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The Property Company (P) Ltd Vs Rohinten Daddy Mazda - The provisions of the Act, 1963 (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.

  SCI (2026.01.07) in The Property Company (P) Ltd Vs Rohinten Daddy Mazda  [2026 INSC 33, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 92 OF 2026, (Arising out of S.L.P (Civil) No. 3906 of 2017)] held that; 

• The provisions of the Act, 1963 (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.

• It has been clarified that when such authorities or bodies are deemed to be a court for certain limited or specified purposes, such a legal fiction must not be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction was created so as to confer powers under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 as well.

Excerpts of the Order;

G. CONCLUSION

# 160. A conspectus of the legal and factual discussion on the power of the CLB to extend time or condone delay under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 is as follows:

i. The appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 preferred by the respondent herein was filed during the period between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016. Therefore, although the appeal was made under the new provision of the Act, 2013, yet the body/forum before which it was made i.e., the CLB, was one constituted under the provisions of the Erstwhile Act. According to Section 10E(4C) of the Erstwhile Act, the CLB was a court only in the restricted sense. There existed no express provision which empowered the CLB to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963 to the proceedings and appeals before itself.

ii. In multiple decisions of this Court, notable and significant emphasis has been placed on which institution/body is seeking  to employ the provisions of the Act, 1963 or exercise the powers conferred under the Act, 1963.

iii. The provisions of the Act, 1963 (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.

iv. In Officer on Special Duty (supra), Prakash H. Jain (supra) and Om Prakash (supra) respectively, this Court has unequivocally held that the power to extend time under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to by statutory authorities, quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless expressly indicated. It has been clarified that when such authorities or bodies are deemed to be a court for certain limited or specified purposes, such a legal fiction must not be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction was created so as to confer powers under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 as well.

v. In Parson Tools (supra) and M.P. Steel (supra) respectively, this Court has developed a body of jurisprudence indicating that the principles underlying Section 14 of the Act, 1963 could be applied to the provisions relating to quasi-judicial bodies, unless  there is any express indication to the contrary in the wording and scheme of the said provision. However, there exists a vital distinction between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 respectively.

vi. The differences between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively are as follows - First, one pertains to the exercise of a discretionary power vested in the courts and the other is a mandatory provision independent of any exercise of discretion; Secondly, one refers to “sufficient cause” which term by itself is subject to a good amount of elasticity and the other has delineated well-defined conditions which must be met; and Lastly, one deals with the extension of time while the other is concerned with the exclusion of time.

vii. The principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively, cannot be analogously applied to proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies because in the former, the courts exercise their discretion in extending and more specifically, adjusting the prescribed period of limitation itself to create a fresh period of limitation. No entitlement as a matter of right arises vis-à-vis extension of time. Whereas, in the latter, the prescribed period of limitation remains intact, no delay is attributed to the litigant and the time during which the abortive proceeding was being prosecuted is expunged in the eyes of the law to place the litigant back or restore his position within the  prescribed period of limitation wherein he is entitled to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, as a matter of right.

viii. The mechanism envisaged under Section 5 is proximally bound and tethered to the discretion with which a civil court is empowered and that under Section 14 is anchored on restoring the right of a litigant to institute an appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation. Both provisions work in the interest of the litigant and seek to further the cause of substantive justice, however, the kind and nature of the power exercised under the two provisions, as well as the mechanism envisaged therein, are quite distinct.

ix. Moreover, the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively also stand on a different footing for the reason that when the legislature has intended to grant powers of extension of time, the same has been expressly indicated either through the manner in which the concerned provision is phrased (more often than not through a proviso) or by the adoption of the Act, 1963 through a separate provision to the special law as a whole (akin to Section 433 of the 2013, Act).

x. Therefore, the decision of this Court in M.P. Steel (supra) would not apply analogously to a situation when the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 are sought to be applied by quasi-judicial bodies which aren’t empowered in that regard.

xi. Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations which saves the inherent power of the CLB would not enable the CLB to extend time for the filing of the appeal or the application itself, as the case may be.

xii. In Ganesan (supra), it has been settled that the savings provision in the Act, 1963 i.e., Section 29(2), is of no relevance when the special or local law deals with a suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, which is to be filed before a quasi-judicial body. The question whether a certain provision in a special or a local law expressly excludes the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively arises only in pursuance of the savings provision under Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963. As a natural corollary, if Section 29(2) is, by itself, inapplicable to a particular case then there would be no need to look into or analyse whether there is any express exclusion.

xiii. An exception to the aforesaid, i.e., a reason why one would still look at whether Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively are “expressly excluded” irrespective of the application of Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963, is when the argument that the principles underlying those provisions of the Act, 1963, must be applied, is being explored.

xiv. Presently, we are dealing with an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 preferred before the CLB – a quasi-judicial body.

We have also answered in the negative on the submission that the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 must be applied. Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963 is, therefore, of no relevance and there arises no occasion to examine whether Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 “expressly excludes” the application of Section 5 of the Act, 1963.

xv. The simpliciter limitation period prescribed under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 must not be read to be merely directory. The presence of any additional pre-emptory language in the form of “but not thereafter” or “shall” would not always be necessary to convey that the prescribed period is mandatory.

xvi. Section 433 of the Act, 2013 which empowers the NCLT and the NCLAT respectively to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963, as far as may be, to the proceedings and appeals before itself, cannot be borrowed to signify the existence of a similar power with respect to the CLB. Moreover, the remedy of the respondent was already time-barred before the coming into force of Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013, let alone the coming into force of Section 433 of the Act, 2013. Hence, the change in law cannot enure to the benefit of the present respondent.

# 161. In the overall view of the matter, we have reached the conclusion that the High Court could be said to have committed an error in dismissing the statutory appeal filed under Section 10F of the  Erstwhile Act and thereby, affirming the order of the CLB condoning the delay of 249 days in filing the appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013.

# 162. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby, allowed. The impugned judgement and order of the High Court is set-aside.

# 163. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

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