Zameer Pawan Kumar Agarwal & Ors vs Pankaj Prabhudayal Goenka, RP of Personal Guarantor & Ors. - The application which was filed on 14.03.2023 was clearly barred by time. We do not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority rejecting Section 94 application as barred by time.

  NCLAT (2025.12.01) in Zameer Pawan Kumar Agarwal & Ors vs Pankaj Prabhudayal Goenka, RP of Personal Guarantor & Ors.[(2025) ibclaw.in 1044 NCLAT, Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1118, 1120 & 1121 of 2025] held that;-

• These appeals have been filed against the order dated 16.05.2025 by which Section 94 application filed by the Appellant has been dismissed as barred by time.

• The Limitation against the Appellant to file or take steps for resolution under IBC, arose atleast from the date when recovery certificate was issued. The mere facts that the Appellant gave and OTS proposal to BoB shall not give any benefit under Section 18 to the Appellant for computing the Limitation from 12.06.2017.

• The application which was filed on 14.03.2023 was clearly barred by time. We do not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority rejecting Section 94 application as barred by time.

Blogger’s comments; The bigger question is,-          

• “Whether limitation is required to be looked into in an application filed under section 94 of the IBC.”

Hon’ble Supreme Court (1992.04.20) in Punjab National Bank And Ors vs Surendra Prasad Sinha (Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1992.) held that;

• "The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy  the rights of the parties.  Section 3 of  the Limitation Act only bars the remedy, but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. The right to  the debt continues to exist notwithstanding the remedy is barred by the limitation. Only exception in which the remedy also becomes  barred  by limitation is the right is destroyed.  Though the right to enforce the debt by judicial process  is barred, the right to debt remains. The time barred debt does not cease to exist by reason of s.3. That right can be exercised in any other manner than by means of a suit. The debt is not extinguished, but the remedy to enforce the liability is destroyed.  What s.3. refers only to the remedy but not to the right of the creditors. Such debt continues to subsists so long as it is not paid. It is not obligatory to file a suit to recover the debt."

Hon’ble Supreme Court (2018.10.11) in B.K. Educational Services Private Limited Vs. Parag Gupta and Associates [Civil Appeal  No.23988 of 2017] has in length noted the difference between debt “due and payable” from debts “due and recoverable”. ;

• # 19. Shri Dholakia also referred to and relied upon Section 60 and 61 of the Contract Act which are set out hereunder:

• “60. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is not indicated.—Where the debtor has omitted to intimate, and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits. 

• 61. Application of payment where neither party appropriates.—Where neither party makes any appropriation the payment shall be applied in discharge of the debts in order of time, whether they are or are not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits. If the debts are of equal standing, the payment shall be applied in discharge of each proportionably.”

• These Sections also recognize the fact that limitation bars the remedy but not the right. In the context in which Section 60 appears, it is interesting to note that Section 60 uses the phrase “actually due and payable to him….” whether its recovery is or is not barred by the limitation law. The expression “actually” makes it clear that in fact a debt must be due and payable notwithstanding the law of limitation. From this, it is very difficult to infer that in the context of the Contract Act, the expression “due and payable” by itself would connote an amount that may be due even though it is time-barred, for otherwise, it would be unnecessary for Section 60 to contain the word “actually” together with the later words, “whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits”.

• # 20. Shri Dholakia went on to cite Bhimsen Gupta v. Bishwanath Prasad Gupta, (2004) 4 SCC 95, and In re Sir Harilal Nemchand Gosalia, AIR 1950 Bom 74, for the proposition that debts “due and payable” must be differentiated from debts “due and recoverable”. .

• In the former case, Section 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 provided for eviction of a tenant where the amount of two months’ rent “lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him” was in arrears. This Court followed Bombay Dyeing (Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328 ), stating as follows:

• “6. Section 11 of the said Act, 1982 deals with eviction of tenants. It begins with non obstante clause. It states that notwithstanding anything  contained in any contract or law to the contrary, no tenant shall be liable to be evicted except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Sections 11(1)(a) to (f). In this case we are concerned with the ground of default which falls under Section 11(1)(d) and which states that where the amount of two months’ rent, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by reason of non-payment within the time fixed by the contract or in the absence of such contract by the last day of the month next following that for which rent is payable then such default would constitute ground for eviction. It is interesting to note that the expression used in Section 11(1)(d) is “lawfully payable” and not “lawfully recoverable” and therefore, Section 11(1) (d) has nothing to do with recovery of arrears of rent. On the contrary, Section 11(1)(d) provides a ground for eviction of the tenant in the eviction suit. It is well settled that law of limitation bars the remedy of the claimant to recover the rent for the period beyond three years prior to the institution of the suit, but that cannot be a ground for defeating the claim of the landlord for decree of eviction on satisfaction of the ingredients of Section 11(1)(d) of the said Act, 1982. In the case of Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay [AIR 1958 SC 328] it has been held that when the debt becomes time-barred the amount is not recoverable lawfully through the process of the court, but it will not mean that the amount has become not lawfully payable. Law does not bar a debtor to pay nor a creditor to accept a barred debt.”

Excerpts of the Order;

(Hybrid Mode) 01.12.2025 Heard Ld. Counsel for the Appellant and the Respondent.

These appeals have been filed against the order dated 16.05.2025 by which Section 94 application filed by the Appellant has been dismissed as barred by time.

Brief facts necessary for deciding the appeals are: the Appellants are Personal Guarantor to the Corporate Debtor namely the "Roselabs Bioscience Limited", various financial facilities were extended to the CD to which the Appellants stood as Personal Guarantors. There was default by CD. Financial Creditor issued the demand notice under Section 13(2) and thereafter filed an application under Section 19 of the Debt Recovery Act, 1993 and the Debt Recovery Tribunal allowed the application in O.A. No. 437 of 2025 on 12.06.2017, recovery certificate was also issued. The Appellant filed Section 94 application on 14.03.2023.

In the application Resolution Professional was appointed who recommended for admission of Section 94 application. The Personal Guarantor (Appellant) also filed an affidavit opposing the application. Adjudicating Authority heard the parties, by the impugned order it held that application having been filed beyond the Limitation is to be rejected.

Ld. Counsel for the Appellant challenging the order submits that the Appellant has given a settlement proposal to Bank of Baroda on 23.02.2022, hence the application filed on 14.03.2023 cannot be barred by Limitation. He further submitted that after recovery certificate which was issued on 12.06.2017, three years period expired during the period under Section 10A, hence the Appellant shall also be entitled to benefit of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition 3 of 2020.

Ld. Counsel for the Bank refuting the submission submits that the application was barred by time the cause of action to the Appellant to pray for its resolution under Section 94 arose when demand notice was issued in 2015 and when recovery certificate was issued on 12.06.2017. Within three years period, the Appellant did not initiate the proceedings, he further submits that even after giving the benefit of period from 25.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 the application is still barred by time. He submits that the OTS given by Bank of Baroda shall not give an extension of Limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act to the Appellant.

We have considered the submissions of the parties and perused the record.

Ld. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that infact the demand notice was issued on 24.08.2015. It is true that the Appellant defaulted in re-payment when the demand notice was issued in the year of 2015 by the Financial Institution, however, even accepting the case of the Appellant that he will have further 3 years period after the recovery certificate was issued on 12.06.2017, we need to examine as to whether application filed on 14.03.2023 is within time, giving the benefit of date 12.06.2017 when recovery certificate was issued.

Section 18 of the Limitation Act provides effect of acknowledgement in writing.

• Section 18(1) provides as follows: -

• Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.

OTS proposal is given by the Appellant to Bank of Baroda. Section 18 cannot be applicable in extending the Limitation against the BoB. The Limitation against the Appellant to file or take steps for resolution under IBC, arose atleast from the date when recovery certificate was issued. The mere facts that the Appellant gave and OTS proposal to BoB shall not give any benefit under Section 18 to the Appellant for computing the Limitation from 12.06.2017. By giving the benefit of the period under the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suo moto Writ Petition the Limitation shall expire in 2022.

The application which was filed on 14.03.2023 was clearly barred by time. We do not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority rejecting Section 94 application as barred by time. We do not find any merit in these appeals.

Appeals are dismissed accordingly.

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The Property Company (P) Ltd Vs Rohinten Daddy Mazda - The provisions of the Act, 1963 (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.

  SCI (2026.01.07) in The Property Company (P) Ltd Vs Rohinten Daddy Mazda  [2026 INSC 33, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 92 OF 2026, (Arising out of S.L.P (Civil) No. 3906 of 2017)] held that; 

• The provisions of the Act, 1963 (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.

• It has been clarified that when such authorities or bodies are deemed to be a court for certain limited or specified purposes, such a legal fiction must not be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction was created so as to confer powers under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 as well.

Excerpts of the Order;

G. CONCLUSION

# 160. A conspectus of the legal and factual discussion on the power of the CLB to extend time or condone delay under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 is as follows:

i. The appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 preferred by the respondent herein was filed during the period between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016. Therefore, although the appeal was made under the new provision of the Act, 2013, yet the body/forum before which it was made i.e., the CLB, was one constituted under the provisions of the Erstwhile Act. According to Section 10E(4C) of the Erstwhile Act, the CLB was a court only in the restricted sense. There existed no express provision which empowered the CLB to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963 to the proceedings and appeals before itself.

ii. In multiple decisions of this Court, notable and significant emphasis has been placed on which institution/body is seeking  to employ the provisions of the Act, 1963 or exercise the powers conferred under the Act, 1963.

iii. The provisions of the Act, 1963 (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.

iv. In Officer on Special Duty (supra), Prakash H. Jain (supra) and Om Prakash (supra) respectively, this Court has unequivocally held that the power to extend time under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to by statutory authorities, quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless expressly indicated. It has been clarified that when such authorities or bodies are deemed to be a court for certain limited or specified purposes, such a legal fiction must not be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction was created so as to confer powers under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 as well.

v. In Parson Tools (supra) and M.P. Steel (supra) respectively, this Court has developed a body of jurisprudence indicating that the principles underlying Section 14 of the Act, 1963 could be applied to the provisions relating to quasi-judicial bodies, unless  there is any express indication to the contrary in the wording and scheme of the said provision. However, there exists a vital distinction between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 respectively.

vi. The differences between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively are as follows - First, one pertains to the exercise of a discretionary power vested in the courts and the other is a mandatory provision independent of any exercise of discretion; Secondly, one refers to “sufficient cause” which term by itself is subject to a good amount of elasticity and the other has delineated well-defined conditions which must be met; and Lastly, one deals with the extension of time while the other is concerned with the exclusion of time.

vii. The principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively, cannot be analogously applied to proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies because in the former, the courts exercise their discretion in extending and more specifically, adjusting the prescribed period of limitation itself to create a fresh period of limitation. No entitlement as a matter of right arises vis-à-vis extension of time. Whereas, in the latter, the prescribed period of limitation remains intact, no delay is attributed to the litigant and the time during which the abortive proceeding was being prosecuted is expunged in the eyes of the law to place the litigant back or restore his position within the  prescribed period of limitation wherein he is entitled to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, as a matter of right.

viii. The mechanism envisaged under Section 5 is proximally bound and tethered to the discretion with which a civil court is empowered and that under Section 14 is anchored on restoring the right of a litigant to institute an appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation. Both provisions work in the interest of the litigant and seek to further the cause of substantive justice, however, the kind and nature of the power exercised under the two provisions, as well as the mechanism envisaged therein, are quite distinct.

ix. Moreover, the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively also stand on a different footing for the reason that when the legislature has intended to grant powers of extension of time, the same has been expressly indicated either through the manner in which the concerned provision is phrased (more often than not through a proviso) or by the adoption of the Act, 1963 through a separate provision to the special law as a whole (akin to Section 433 of the 2013, Act).

x. Therefore, the decision of this Court in M.P. Steel (supra) would not apply analogously to a situation when the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 are sought to be applied by quasi-judicial bodies which aren’t empowered in that regard.

xi. Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations which saves the inherent power of the CLB would not enable the CLB to extend time for the filing of the appeal or the application itself, as the case may be.

xii. In Ganesan (supra), it has been settled that the savings provision in the Act, 1963 i.e., Section 29(2), is of no relevance when the special or local law deals with a suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, which is to be filed before a quasi-judicial body. The question whether a certain provision in a special or a local law expressly excludes the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively arises only in pursuance of the savings provision under Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963. As a natural corollary, if Section 29(2) is, by itself, inapplicable to a particular case then there would be no need to look into or analyse whether there is any express exclusion.

xiii. An exception to the aforesaid, i.e., a reason why one would still look at whether Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively are “expressly excluded” irrespective of the application of Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963, is when the argument that the principles underlying those provisions of the Act, 1963, must be applied, is being explored.

xiv. Presently, we are dealing with an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 preferred before the CLB – a quasi-judicial body.

We have also answered in the negative on the submission that the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 must be applied. Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963 is, therefore, of no relevance and there arises no occasion to examine whether Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 “expressly excludes” the application of Section 5 of the Act, 1963.

xv. The simpliciter limitation period prescribed under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 must not be read to be merely directory. The presence of any additional pre-emptory language in the form of “but not thereafter” or “shall” would not always be necessary to convey that the prescribed period is mandatory.

xvi. Section 433 of the Act, 2013 which empowers the NCLT and the NCLAT respectively to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963, as far as may be, to the proceedings and appeals before itself, cannot be borrowed to signify the existence of a similar power with respect to the CLB. Moreover, the remedy of the respondent was already time-barred before the coming into force of Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013, let alone the coming into force of Section 433 of the Act, 2013. Hence, the change in law cannot enure to the benefit of the present respondent.

# 161. In the overall view of the matter, we have reached the conclusion that the High Court could be said to have committed an error in dismissing the statutory appeal filed under Section 10F of the  Erstwhile Act and thereby, affirming the order of the CLB condoning the delay of 249 days in filing the appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013.

# 162. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby, allowed. The impugned judgement and order of the High Court is set-aside.

# 163. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

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