Prem Singh & Ors vs Birbal & Ors - Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore, apply where a document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to instruments which are presumptively invalid. [See Unni & Anr. vs. Kunchi Amma & Ors. (1891) ILR XIV Mad.26) and Sheo Shankar Gir vs. Ram Shewak Chowdhri & Ors. [(1897) ILR XXIV Cal. 77].

 SCI  (2006.05.02) in Prem Singh & Ors vs Birbal & Ors   [Appeal (civil)  2412 of 2006] held that; 

• Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore, apply where a document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to instruments which are presumptively invalid. [See Unni & Anr. vs. Kunchi Amma & Ors. (1891) ILR XIV Mad.26) and Sheo Shankar Gir vs. Ram Shewak Chowdhri & Ors. [(1897) ILR XXIV Cal. 77].

• If the plaintiff is in possession of a property, he may file a suit for declaration that the deed is not binding upon him but if he is not in possession thereof, even under a void transaction, the right by way of adverse possession may be claimed. Thus, it is not correct to contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application at all in the event the transaction is held to be void.

• There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption.

Excerpts of the Order; 

Leave granted.

Whether the provision of Article 59 of the Limitation Act would be attracted in a suit filed for setting aside a Deed of Sale, is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 2.9.2002 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur Civil Second Appeal No.8 of 1998.

Respondent No.1 herein filed a suit for declaration and partition of the land consisting of 19 bighas and 12 biswas claiming himself to be a co-sharer with the defendant. One Mihilal was the owner of the suit land comprising of different khasra numbers, situate in Village Akhoda, in the District of Bhind. The said suit was filed by the plaintiff-Respondent No.1 alleging that his father Chhedilal had a share therein in addition to owner of another land in khasra No.516, measuring 6 biswas. Chhedilal died in the year 1950. His wife also died soon thereafter. At the time of the death of his father, the plaintiff-Respondent No.1 was a minor. He started living with Appellant No.4-Lal Bihari. He, allegedly, executed a deed of sale on 1.1.1961 in respect of khasra No.516 measuring 6 biswas to Babu Singh and Tek Singh for a consideration of Rs.7,000/-. His age in the Sale Deed was shown to be 26 years. Only on 17.8.1979, he, allegedly, gathered the information that the land under khasra No.516 was purported to have been sold by him to the aforementioned persons. He, thereafter, filed the suit on 24.9.1979. The Appellant herein pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. The said suit of the Respondent No.1 was dismissed by the trial court by a judgment and decree dated 29.4.1995 holding that the suit was barred by limitation. An appeal was preferred thereagainst by the plaintiff. The 1st Appellate Court by judgment and decree dated 11.12.1997, held that the said Deed of Sale was got executed by playing fraud on the plaintiff who was a minor at the relevant point of time and the said Deed of Sale, thus, being void ab intio, the limitation of three years from the date of attaining of majority, as is provided for in Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would not be applicable in the instant case. A second appeal preferred by the Appellants herein was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 2.9.2002.

Mr. S.K. Gambhir, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants, in support of this appeal, contended that:

• i) Having regard to the fact that Respondent No.1 herein filed a suit on 24.9.1979 for setting aside the Deed of Sale dated 1.12.1961, the same was clearly barred by limitation;

• ii) The period of limitation for setting aside the said Deed of Sale, as contended by the plaintiff, did not start running from 22.8.1979, but from the date he attained majority;

• iii) Even assuming that the findings of the learned Appellate Court were correct that the Respondent No.1 was aged about 12 years in 1961 and he attained majority in the year 1969, he was required to file the suit within three years thereafter.

• (iv) The Appellate Court as also the High Court failed to take into consideration the documentary evidence which clearly established that Respondent No.1 was a major on the date of execution of the said Deed of sale.

Mr. Naresh Kaushik, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents, on the other hand, submitted that

• i) On the date of execution of the said deed of sale, Respondent No.1 being a minor, Article 59 of the Limitation Act would have no application;

• ii) When a transaction is void, as a suit can be filed at any time, the provisions of the Limitation Act are not attracted.

Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Balvant N. Viswamitra & Ors. vs. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (Dead) through LRs. & Ors. [(2004) 8 SCC 706].

The trial court, in view of the pleadings of the parties framed several issues. Issue No.4 framed by the trial court reads as under:

• "4. Whether suit is within the period of Limitation?"

• The learned trial court found that on 1.12.1961, when the deed of sale was executed, Respondent No.1 was aged about 12 years. However, the trial court opined that the plaintiff-Respondent No.1 failed to prove that he acquired knowledge of the said purported fraudulent execution of the Deed of Sale only on 22.8.1979. On the basis of the said finding the suit was held to be barred by limitation.

The learned First Appellate Court, on the other hand, opined that the suit was not barred by limitation.

The High Court also, as noticed hereinbefore, by reason of the impugned judgment, upheld the judgment of the First Appellate Court.

Limitation is a statute of repose. It ordinarily bars a remedy, but, does not extinguish a right. The only exception to the said rule is to be found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides that at the determination of the period prescribed thereby, limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.

An extinction of right, as contemplated by the provisions of the Limitation Act, prima facie would be attracted in all types of suits. The Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, as prescribed by the Articles, provides that upon lapse of the prescribed period, the institution of a suit will be barred. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that irrespective of the fact as to whether any defence is set out is raised by the defendant or not, in the event a suit is found to be barred by limitation, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and every application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when a relief is claimed on the ground of fraud or mistake. It only encompasses within its fold fraudulent transactions which are voidable transactions.

A suit for cancellation of instrument is based on the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under:

• "31. When cancellation may be ordered.--

• (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.

• (2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation."

Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 thus, refers to both void and voidable document. It provides for a discretionary relief.

When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non-est in the eye of law, as it would be a nullity.

Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by Article 59. Even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary Article would be.

Article 59 would be attracted when coercion, undue influence, misappropriation or fraud which the plaintiff asserts is required to be proved. Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore, apply where a document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to instruments which are presumptively invalid. [See Unni & Anr. vs. Kunchi Amma & Ors. (1891) ILR XIV Mad.26) and Sheo Shankar Gir vs. Ram Shewak Chowdhri & Ors. [(1897) ILR XXIV Cal. 77].

It is not in dispute that by reason of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the scope has been enlarged from old Article 91 of 1908 Act. By reason of Article 59, the provisions contained in Articles 91 and 114 of 1908 Act had been combined.

If the plaintiff is in possession of a property, he may file a suit for declaration that the deed is not binding upon him but if he is not in possession thereof, even under a void transaction, the right by way of adverse possession may be claimed. Thus, it is not correct to contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application at all in the event the transaction is held to be void.

Respondent No.1 has not alleged that fraudulent misrepresentation was made to him as regards the character of the document. According to him, there had been a fraudulent misrepresentation as regards its contents.

In Ningawwa vs. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabnar & Ors [AIR 1968 SC 956], this Court held that the fraudulent misrepresentation as regards character of a document is void but fraudulent misrepresentation as regards contents of a document is voidable stating:

• "The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable"

In that case, a fraud was found to have been played and it was held that as the suit was instituted within a few days after the Appellant therein came to know of the fraud practiced on her, the same was void. It was, however, held:

• "Article 91 of the Indian Limitation Act provides that a suit to set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for (and no other provision of the Act applies to the circumstances of the case) shall be subject to a three year's limitation which begins to run when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside are known to him. In the present case, the trial court has found, upon examination of the evidence, that at the very time of the execution of the gift deed, Ex. 45 the appellant knew that her husband prevailed upon her to convey survey Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village to him by undue influence. The finding of the trial court is based upon the admission of the appellant herself in the course of her evidence. In view of this finding of the trial court it is manifest that the suit of the appellant is barred under Article 91 of the Limitation Act so far as Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village are concerned"

In Ponnamma Pillai Indira Pillai vs. Padmanabhan Channar Kesavan Channar & Ors. [1968 K.L.T. 673 : AIR 1969 Kerala 163], a full Bench of the Kerala High Court, while considering the effect of Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act, 1908 observed:

• "When the law confers the capacity on one in a group to give a valid discharge without the concurrence of the others of an obligation owing to them jointly (in this case to restore the properties trespassed upon), there is no longer any reason for treating the case differently from the case where all the members of a group have ceased to be under disability, without any one of them acquiring the capacity to give a discharge without the concurrence of the others, except that in the former case the disability of the group to give a discharge ceases, when one in the group acquires the capacity to give it without the concurrence of the others; whereas in the latter the disability of the group to give a discharge ceases only when the last of the persons under disability ceases to be under it. As we have said, if in the latter case the suit must be filed within three years of the last of them ceasing to be under disability, we perceive no reason why in the former, the suit need not be filed within the same period, for, in both cases the real disability is the incapacity of the group to give a discharge of an obligation owing to them jointly, though that arises from the minority, idiocy or insanity of all or some in the group; and in the one case the disability ceases when one in the group acquires the capacity to give a discharge without the concurrence of the others, and in the other when all in the group acquire the capacity to give the discharge jointly. The soul of law is reason and if there is no reason for marking the distinction between the two cases, a strict adherence to the ambit of the expression "cessation of the disability" in Section 8 as confined to the disability mentioned in Section 6, may not be the best means to understand the aim and purpose of the legislature."

Yet again in P.C.K. Muthia Chettiar & Ors. vs. V.E.S. Shanmugham Chettiar (dead) & Anr. [AIR 1969 SC 552], it was held that the Limitation Act would also apply in case of fraud. {See also Sounder (Executrix of the Will of Rose Maud Gallie, Deceased) vs. Anglia Building Society [1971] 1 AC 1004} In Balvant N. Viswamitra & Ors. vs. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (Dead) Through LRS. & Ors. [(2004) 8 SCC 706], this Court opined that a void decree can be challenged even in execution or a collateral proceeding holding:

• "The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the decree passed by the trial court can be said to be "null" and "void". In our opinion, the law on the point is well settled. The distinction between a decree which is void and a decree which is wrong, incorrect, irregular or not in accordance with law cannot be overlooked or ignored. Where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or making an order, a decree or order passed by such court would be without jurisdiction, non est and void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of the court to pass a decree or make an order. Such defect has always been treated as basic and fundamental and a decree or order passed by a court or an authority having no jurisdiction is a nullity. Validity of such decree or order can be challenged at any stage, even in execution or collateral proceedings."

There is another aspect of the matter.

There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent No.1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.

If a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property purportedly conveyed thereunder. He could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority. Here, the plaintiff did not either sue within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority. Therefore, the suit was rightly held to be barred by limitation by the trial court.

Since the lower Appellate Court and the High Court were not right in law in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation, the judgments and decrees of the lower Appellate Court and that of the High Court are liable to be set aside and dismissal of the suit by the trial court on the ground that it is barred by limitation is liable to be restored. Hence, we allow this appeal, setting aside the judgments and decrees of the High Court and that of the lower Appellate Court and restore the judgment and decree of the trial court. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs in all the courts.

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Rajiv Ranjan Sharma and Anr. vs. Vikas Gopichand Khiyani - Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the same principle and clarified the law laid down in V Nagarajan and held that; (i) the limitation stops running on the e-filing of an appeal before the NCLAT and not on presentation of a physical copy; (ii) the date on which the order is pronounced is to be excluded from the calculation of limitation, and (iii) the time taken by the NCLT to provide the appellant with the certified copy would be excluded from the calculation of limitation, provided the appellant applies within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 61(2) of the IBC.

 NCLAT (2026.09.02) in Rajiv Ranjan Sharma and Anr. vs. Vikas Gopichand Khiyani [(2026) ibclaw.in 1010 NCLAT,  Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1458 of 2026 and I.A. No. 5545, 5636 of 2026 with Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1459 of 2026 and I.A. No. 5547, 5639 of 2026] held that; 

• Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the same principle and clarified the law laid down in V Nagarajan and held that; (i) the limitation stops running on the e-filing of an appeal before the NCLAT and not on presentation of a physical copy; (ii) the date on which the order is pronounced is to be excluded from the calculation of limitation, and (iii) the time taken by the NCLT to provide the appellant with the certified copy would be excluded from the calculation of limitation, provided the appellant applies within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 61(2) of the IBC.

• In Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited [(2017)ibclaw.in 01 SC], while interpreting Section 9 IBC, this Court underscores the IBC’s strict procedural discipline i.e., only applications strictly conforming to statutory requirements can be entertained. This principle is also applicable to limitation issues under section 61(2), as it supports the idea that tribunals must operate within the bounds of the Code, without adding equitable or discretionary powers not conferred by statute.

Excerpts of the Order; 

IA No. 5636 of 2026 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1458 of 2026 and IA No. 5639 of 2026in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1459 of 2026.

Delay condonation application bearing IA No. 5636 of 2026 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1458 of 2026 and IA No. 5639 of 2026 in CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1459 of 2026 have been moved by the Appellants to condone the delay of 40 days which has occurred in filing the appeals against the impugned order dated 18th November 2025 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench (Adjudicating Authority), in IA No. 3892 of 2025, IA No. 3893 of 2025 moved in CP (IB) No. 285 of 2024, whereby the application moved by the appellant has been dismissed as premature.

# 2. Keeping in view the identical facts, both delay condonation applications moved in both the appeals are being disposed of by passing this common order.

# 3. Ld. Counsel for the Appellants submit that the Applicants are individual home buyers who have acted with due diligence but the delay of 40 days had occurred in filing the present appeal. However, the delay is neither intentional nor deliberate, but due to the fact that the impugned order dated 18thNovember 2025 was not communicated to the appellants immediately and the order was uploaded on the portal of the NCLT only on 09th December 2025 and thereafter, immediately upon gaining knowledge of the order, the applicants sought legal assistance for filing the appeal, however, the office of the Counsel was closed from 8th December 2025 to 2nd January 2026, and it is on this account the appeal could not be filed in time.

# 4. It is further submitted that the limitation time for filing the appeal i.e. 45 days, expired on 23 January 2026. However, the applicants prepared the appeal, but due to a series of public holidays falling in the last week of January 2026, the appeal could not be filed and after securing the services of the notary public to execute the mandatory affidavits, the Appeal was filed immediately.

# 5. It is further submitted that the delay which has occurred in filing the appeal is not intentional and has occurred due to the reasons which were not under the control of the Appellants, and therefore the same be condoned. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied on the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Sanjay Pandurang Kalate vs Vistara ITCL (India) Limited and others, [(2023) ibclaw.in 154 SC] : (2024) 3 Supreme Court Cases 27.

# 6. We have heard Ld. Counsel for the Appellant and have perused the record.

# 7. The Registry has reported that the impugned judgment was passed on 18th November 2025, and the limitation starts ticking from the next day i.e. 19th November 2025. The period of 30 days expired on 18th December 2025, while the appeal was e-filed on 3rd February 2026 with a delay of 45 days beyond stipulated 30 days.

# 8. Section 61(1) of the IBC stipulates that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Companies Act 2013, any person aggrieved by the order of the Adjudicating Authority “under this Part” may prefer an appeal to NCLAT. Sub-Section (2) of Section 61 provides for a period of limitation in the following terms:

• “61. Appeals and Appellate Authority—

• (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained under the Companies Act, 2013, any person aggrieved by the order of the Adjudicating Authority under this part may prefer an appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal.

• (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal: Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days. 

• […]”

Sub-Section (2) of Section 61 provides for a limitation period of thirty days. The proviso to Section 61(2) provides that NLCAT may allow an appeal to be filed beyond a period of thirty days by a maximum of fifteen days on the demonstration of sufficient cause for the delay.

# 9. Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules 2016 stipulates that for computation of a time period as provided, the day from which the said period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. Rule 3 provides as follows:

• “3. Computation of time period—

• Where a period is prescribed by the Act and these rules or under any other law or is fixed by the Appellate Tribunal for doing any act, in computing the time, the day from which the said period is to be reckoned shall be excluded, and if the last day expires on a day when the office of the Appellate Tribunal is closed, that day and any succeeding day on which the Appellate Tribunal remains closed shall also be excluded.”

# 10. Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act 1963 provides as follows:

• “12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings—

• (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.

• (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded.

• (3) ….

• (4) ….”

# 11. Perusal of the impugned order would reveal that the same has been passed on 18th November 2025 in the presence of the counsel for the appellant/applicant. Nothing has been placed before us which may reflect that the impugned orders have not been pronounced on 18th November 2025. Therefore, when the impugned order dated 18th November 2025 is pronounced and dictated in the open court on the same day, the limitation will start ticking from that day and not from the day of uploading of the order.

# 12. The appellant may not get any benefit of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Pandurang Kalate v. Vistra ITCL (India) Ltd. and Ors.,(2023) ibclaw.in 154 SC as issue therein was whether limitation for filing an appeal to the NCLAT ran from 17-05-2023, the date borne on the NCLT order, or from 30-05-2023, the date on which the order was uploaded, when it was undisputed that no order had been pronounced on 17-05-2023 and in these facts it was held that limitation under Section 61 is linked to the date of pronouncement; the NCLT Rules draw a clear distinction between hearing and pronouncement, and pronouncement cannot be dispensed with. Since the cause list showed the matter for admission and not for pronouncement, and no substantive order was passed on 17-05-2023, limitation did not begin on that date. In the facts of the case, the date of upload was also the date of pronouncement, and the 30-day period therefore commenced on 30-05-2023. The appeal e-filed on 10-07-2023 was beyond thirty days but within the condonable period of fifteen days.

# 13. However, in the case at hand the impugned orders were pronounced in the court. Thus the Appellants cannot take any benefit from this precedent.

# 14. In V Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Limited & Ors., (2021) ibclaw.in 157 SC, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that when the judgment has been pronounced in open court, the period of limitation starts running from that very day. The only concession an applicant may get is by excluding the period consumed by the Ld., Adjudicating Authority for preparation of the certified copy, if the application for the certified copy has been presented within the stipulated 30 days. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under;

• “19……The import of Section 12 of the Limitation Act and its explanation is to assign the responsibility of applying for a certified copy of the order on a party. A person wishing to file an appeal is expected to file an application for a certified copy before the expiry of the limitation period, upon which the “time requisite” for obtaining a copy is to be excluded. However, the time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy is made cannot be excluded. If no application for a certified copy has been made, no exclusion can ensue. In fact, the explanation to the provision is a clear indicator of the legal position that the time which is taken by the court to prepare the decree or order cannot be excluded before the application to obtain a copy is made. It cannot be said that the right to receive a free copy under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act obviated the obligation on the appellant to seek a certified copy through an application. The appellant has urged that Rule 14 of the NCLAT Rules empowers the NCLAT to exempt parties from compliance with the requirement of any of the rules in the interests of substantial justice, which has been typically exercised in favour of allowing a downloaded copy in lieu of a certified copy. While it may well be true that waivers on filing an appeal with a certified copy are often granted for the purposes of judicial determination, they do not confer an automatic right on an applicant to dispense with compliance and render Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules nugatory. The act of filing an application for a certified copy is not just a technical requirement for computation of limitation but also an indication of the diligence of the aggrieved party in pursuing the litigation in a timely fashion. In a similar factual scenario, the NCLAT had dismissed an appeal as time-barred under Section 61(2) of the IBC since the appellant therein was present in court, and yet chose to file for a certified copy after five months of the pronouncement of the order.”

• 21. The answer to the two issues set out in Section C of the judgement- (i) when will the clock for calculating the limitation period run for proceedings under the IBC; and (ii) is the annexation of a certified copy mandatory for an appeal to the NCLAT against an order passed under the IBC – must be based on a harmonious interpretation of the applicable legal regime, given that the IBC is a Code in itself and has overriding effect. Sections 61(1) and (2) of the IBC consciously omit the requirement of limitation being computed from when the “order is made available to the aggrieved party”, in contradistinction to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act. Owing to the special nature of the IBC, the aggrieved party is expected to exercise due diligence and apply for a certified copy upon pronouncement of the order it seeks to assail, in consonance with the requirements of Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act allows for an exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order appealed against. It is not open to a person aggrieved by an order under the IBC to await the receipt of a free certified copy under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act 2013 read with Rule 50 of the NCLT and prevent limitation from running. Accepting such a construction will upset the timely framework of the IBC. The litigant has to file its appeal within thirty days, which can be extended up to a period of fifteen days, and no more, upon showing sufficient cause. A sleight of interpretation of procedural rules cannot be used to defeat the substantive objective of a legislation that has an impact on the economic health of a nation.

• 22. On the second question, Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandates the certified copy being annexed to an appeal, which continues to bind litigants under the IBC. While it is true that the tribunals, and even this Court, may choose to exempt parties from compliance with this procedural requirement in the interest of substantial justice, as re-iterated in Rule 14 of the NCLAT Rules, the discretionary waiver does not act as an automatic exception where litigants make no efforts to pursue a timely resolution of their grievance. The appellant having failed to apply for a certified copy, rendered the appeal filed before the NCLAT as clearly barred by limitation.”

# 15. In Sanket Kumar Agarwal v. APG Logistics Private Limited, (2023) ibclaw.in 72 SC, Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the same principle and clarified the law laid down in V Nagarajan and held that; (i) the limitation stops running on the e-filing of an appeal before the NCLAT and not on presentation of a physical copy; (ii) the date on which the order is pronounced is to be excluded from the calculation of limitation, and (iii) the time taken by the NCLT to provide the appellant with the certified copy would be excluded from the calculation of limitation, provided the appellant applies within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 61(2) of the IBC.

# 16. In Tata Steel Ltd. Vs Raj Kumar Banerjee, (2025) ibclaw.in 177 SC, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under;

• “11.1. Once the prescribed and condonable periods (i.e., 30 + 15 days) expire, the NCLAT has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals, regardless of the reason for the delay. In Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited [(2017)ibclaw.in 01 SC], while interpreting Section 9 IBC, this Court underscores the IBC’s strict procedural discipline i.e., only applications strictly conforming to statutory requirements can be entertained. This principle is also applicable to limitation issues under section 61(2), as it supports the idea that tribunals must operate within the bounds of the Code, without adding equitable or discretionary powers not conferred by statute. This Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Another [(2021) ibclaw.in 40 SC] has categorically held that the NCLAT cannot condone any delay beyond 15 days even on equitable grounds; and that the appellate mechanism under IBC is strictly time-bound by design to preserve the speed and certainty of the insolvency resolution process.

• 11.2. Thus, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute. Accordingly, the second issue is answered by us.”

The appellants were represented before the NCLT on 18 November 2025 when impugned orders were passed/pronounced. The appellants have demonstrated no effort on their part to secure certified copy of the said orders and has relied on the date of the uploading of the order (12 December 2025) on the website of the NCLT. The period of limitation for filing the appeals under Section 61(1) against the orders of the NCLT dated 18 November 2025, expired on 18 December 2025 in view of the thirty-day period prescribed under Section 61(2) of the Code. Any scope for condonation of delay expired on 02 January 2026, in view of the expiry of outer condonable limit of 15 days prescribed under the proviso to Section 61(2)”.

# 17. Therefore, keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered view that the impugned order was pronounced on 18 November 2025, and the appeals were, filed on 3 February 2026, beyond the stipulated 45 days, while this appellate tribunal has jurisdiction only to condone the delay up to 15 days, beyond stipulated 30 days. Thus, the above applications moved by the appellant to condone the delay of 45 days appears to be not maintainable and are dismissed as such.

# 18. Since the delay condonation applications have been dismissed, the Appeals are also dismissed.

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